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Labor Law-U.S. Arbitration Act-Enforceability Thereunder of
Agreements to Arbitrate Labor Disputes
At common law, agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes
are revocable by either party at any time before an award is made, and
courts will not, in the absence of statutory authority, grant specific
performance of such an agreement, or allow it to be pleaded as a bar to
an action." In order to abrogate this common law rule, fifteen states2
and the United States3 have enacted statutes which make written agree-
ments to arbitrate existing or future disputes irrevocable and enforce-
able. Four other states4 have passed the uniform arbitration act which
is applicable to existing disputes only, and does not provide for direct
enforcement.
The United States Act is based on the draft state arbitration act
approved by the American Arbitration Association and presented to
Congress by the American Bar Association. Section 2 of the act pro-
vides that written agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes
arising out of maritime transactions or transactions involving interstate
or foreign commerce shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Sec-
tion 3 provides for a stay of proceedings where suit is brought on any
issue referable to arbitration, and Section 4 provides for direct com-
pulsion of arbitration. 5 The remaining sections provide for appoint-
ment of arbitrators by the court, entering an award as a judgment of
court, vacating or modifying the award, and confirming it by order of
the court,
1 Executory arbitration agreements, while not illegal or void, would oust the
courts of jurisdiction and were therefore held to be against public policy. Specific
performance would not be granted since either party could revoke and make the
court order useless. Hamilton v. Home Insurance Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890);
Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U.S. 1874); Tobey v. County of
Bristol, 3 Story 800, Fed. Case No. 14,065 (1845) ; Rueda v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
180 Ore. 133, 175 P. 2d 778 (1946) ; RSSTATEMENT, CoNRAcrs §550 (1932). See
generally, Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83
U. oF PA. L. R~v. 132 (1934); Simpson, Specific Performance of Arbitration
Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 160 (1934).
2Arizona, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
'United States Arbitration Act, 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §§1-14
(Supp. 1948).
'Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming. For an analysis of the uniform
act see Sturges, Arbitration Under the North Carolina Statute-The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 6 N. C. L. REv. 363 (1928).
1 Section 2, making certain written agreements to arbitrate valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable is, of necessity, limited to maritime and interstate commerce trans-
actions, since Congress has no power to legislate with respect to the validity
of contracts generally. But sections 3 and 4 are broad and not limited to maritime
and interstate commerce transactions, since they deal with procedure in the federal
courts, over which Congressional power is complete and not limited. Agostini
Bros. Building Corp. v. U.S., 142 F. 2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Donahue v. Susque-
hanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1943).
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The act has been successful in changing the common law rfile as to
written agreements to arbitrate in commercial and maritime contracts,
and under it the federal courts now specifically enforce agreements to
arbitrate and allow stay of suit until arbitration is had However,
section 1 of the act, after defining "maritime transactions" and "com-
merce," adds a clause, ". . . but nothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." This
clause has led to a conflict between the circuit courts of appeals, as to
whether or not any part of the'act applies to arbitration clauses in col-
lective bargaining agreements. 7
Three decisions of the third circuits have applied section 3 of the
act and allowed stay of action, even though the arbitration clause in-
volved was contained in a collective bargaining agreement. In Watkins
v. Hudson Coal Co.9 that court held that the exclusion of contracts of
employment in section 1 of the act did not apply to section 3, and al-
lowed a stay of suit until arbitration was had.10 The court reasoned,
Judge Goodrich writing the opinion, that the clause excluding employ-
ment contracts in section 1 is applicable only to the definitions of "mari-
time transactions" and "commerce" contained therein, and since these
terms appear again only in section 2, section 3 and the remainder of the
act are not limited by the clause."
'Agostini Bros. Building Corp. v. U.S., 142 F. 2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Kulu-
kundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
The great majority of collective bargaining agreements now contain a clause
providing for arbitration of any disputes arising from interpretation of the con-
tract, which have not been settled through a specified grievance procedure. Of
the fifteen states which have statutes similar to the United States act, six, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, have
made their statutes applicable to labor contracts either by specific provision or
court interpretation. Comment, Arbitration of Labor Contract Disputes, 43 ILL. L.
Rv. 678 (1948).
' Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F. 2d 970 (3rd Cir. 1947) (followed the
Donahue case without any mention of the exclusion clause) ; Watkins v. Hudson
Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946);
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) (the court
made no mention of the exclusion clause in section 1, but did apply section 3 to a
collective bargaining agreement).
'151 F. 2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945).
"0 One judge dissented and followed the view of the fourth and sixth circuits
that the exclusion in section 1 should apply to the entire act.
" The argument has also been advanced that collective bargaining agreements
should not be excluded from the act since such an agreement should not be con-
sidered a "contract of employment" within the sense of the exception. Freiden,
Legal Status of Labor Arbitration, NEw YoRK UNivERsITY FIRST ANNUAL CON-
FEREN oN LABOR (1948) 233, 247. In Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 692,
104 P. 2d 770 (1940), the court reached a somewhat similar result when it held
that an exclusion of "contracts pertaining to labor" from the California Arbitration
Act did not exclude collective bargaining agreements. A comment in 29 CALIF.
L. R v. 411 (1941) indicates this case was decided on the grounds that public
policy favors the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration.
Also, by bringing an action under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act there
[Vol. 2
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One case in the sixth circuit1 2 and one in the fourth circuit'3 have
reached results contra to the third circuit opinions, holding that the
exclusion clause in section 1 applies to the whole act. The more ac-
curate interpretation of the exclusion clause appears to be that followed
by Judge Parker of the fourth circuit in International Union United
Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.,
Inc.14 Section 1, which contains the words of exclusion, is introductory
only, and contains no substantive provisions of the act. Being placed
in such an introductory section, the words "nothing herein contained"
seem clearly to indicate that the exclusion was intended to apply to all
the substantive provisions of the act, and not just to one particular
section. To say, as the third circuit decisions do, that the exclusion
applies only to the definition of "commerce" in section 1, and therefore
only to section 2 of the substantive portions of the act, would result in
the exclusion clause being completely meaningless. 15 By this reasoning
contracts of employment would be excluded from the class of contracts
made valid, irrevocable, and enforceable in section 2, but would still be
indirectly enforceable by stay of action under section 3, and directly
enforceable by court order under section 4.
Since there was no consideration of the exclusion clause in the
passage of the act through Congress, and no indication as to whether
or not Congress intended the act to apply to collective bargaining agree-
ments,16 none of the decisions could rely on legislative history as evi-
lence of Congressional intention.17 However, the history of the prepa-
ration and submission of the act to Congress by the American Bar
Association indicates that, while originally intended to apply to all types
of arbitration agreements, it was later amended to exclude collective
may be enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate without resort to the arbitration
act. In Northland Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 431 (D.
Minn. 1937) an action was brought by the company for a declaration of rights
under a collective bargaining agreement. The declaratory judgment held that the
dispute was subject to arbitration under the contract. See also Oil Workers
International Union v. Taxoma Natural Gas Co., 146 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir. 1944).
" Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) (defendant's motion
to stay the proceedings was overruled since the agreement to arbitrate was in a
labor contract).
" International Union United Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial Hard-
wood Flooring Co., Inc., 168 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) (refused to allow a stay of
proceedings under section 3 of the act).
,Ibid.
15 "Unless the excepting language applies to the entire statute, it seems to me
rather meaningless." Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311, 321 (3rd Cir.
1945), dissenting opinion by Judge McAllister.
" In discussions of the bill the committee reports consistently referred to it as
a "commercial arbitration act," and there was no consideration of the meaning of
the exclusion clause.
"7 The only reference to the intention of Congress was made in the Colonial
Hardwood Flooring Co. case, in which Judge Parker said, "It is perfectly clear,
we think, that it was the intention of Congress to exclude contracts of employment
from the operation of all these provisions."
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bargaining contracts from its operation. As first prepared by the Asso-
ciation's Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law in 1921,
the bill did not contain the exclusion.' 8  In 1923, to eliminate opposi-
tion by a leader of the Seamen's Union, 10 and because of fear that addi-
tional labor opposition might threaten passage of the act through Con-
gress, 20 the exclusion clause was added to the end of section 1.
While agreeing that the better reasoned interpretation of the act is
that, in its present form, it does not make an arbitration clause in a col-
lective bargaining agreement specifically enforceable, it is submitted that
public policy and common sense demand that such agreements should
be enforced. 21 Arbitration has become a recognized and effective
method for the settlement of industrial disputes, and refusal by courts
to enforce an arbitration agreement might cause resort to unnecessary
litigation or the use of force in the settlement of disputes, which is the
very thing the agreement was intended to prevent.2 2 Enforcement
would not amount to compulsory arbitration. There would be no com-
pulsion by the courts until the parties had voluntarily agreed in writing
that they would arbitrate.23 In reality, most arbitration clauses in labor
contracts are now carried out by both parties without any need for
court action. But in situations where one party may now refuse to
arbitrate, the knowledge that courts will enforce the agreement would
greatly reduce the number of these refusals. In the federal field, an
8 XLVI A. B. A. REP. 359 (1921).
' XLVIII A. B. A. REP. 287 (1923).
20 "The proviso in it which excepts from its operation workers' agreements,
while regarded by its framers as no improvement, was suggested by Herbert
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, a staunch friend of the measure, as a wise sop
to the Cerberus of Labor." Gordon, International Aspects of Trade Arbitration,
11 A. B. A. J. 717 (1925). Labor opposition was based on a feeling that specific
performance of arbitration agreements in labor contracts resembled compulsory
arbitration, and a fear that it might lead to forced arbitration of disputes over
new contract terms.
21 "In the field of industry, a chorus of deserved derision would silence declara-
tion that a collective bargaining agreement for arbitration of future issues was
violation of public policy. If there ever was public policy against agreements to
arbitrate, it has disappeared." Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dis-
trict, 209 Minn. 182, 186, 296 N.W. 475, 477 (1941). See also Simpson, Specific
Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 160 (1934) ; Fraenkel,
The Legal E&forceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Labor Disputes, 1 ARn. J.
360 (1937).
2 This public policy view appears to be the real reason that the third circuit
has applied the act to collective bargaining agreements. In Evans v. Hudson Coal
Co., 165 F. 2d 970, 974 (3rd Cir. 1947) the court said, "Time, energy, and money
have been expended by both Mine Workers and Operators in litigation in the
courts of this Circuit. We are of the opinion that these expenditures have been
unrewarding. Mine Workers and Operators have made a series of valid and
binding agreements for arbitration. They must submit to the arbitration upon
which they have agreed."
2 The parties could specify in the arbitration agreement exactly what type of
dispute they will arbitrate, and any court order of enforcement or stay of action
would be limited to those disputes only. This would eliminate any danger of
forced arbitration of disputes over new contract terms.
[Vol. 28
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amendment to the United States Arbitration Act extending it to embrace
written agreements to arbitrate labor disputes would lead to settlement
of even more industrial disputes by peaceful arbitration.24
LEROY F. FULLER.
Real Property-Deeds-Requisites to a Valid
Delivery in North Carolina
In the recent North Carolina case of Ballard v. Ballrd,' a grantor
drafted, signed, sealed, and registered an instrument which purported
to convey for a consideration a tract of land to the grantee (son of the
grantor), subject to a twenty-one year estate reserved by the grantor.
After the grantor's death, the widow, who hafd married the grantor
after the conveyance, filed a petition for dower claiming that the deed
was not delivered, and the Superior Court granted this petition, but the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that registration in
addition to a declaration by the grantor that he had conveyed to the
grantee was sufficient evidence of an effective delivery even though it
was not shown that the deed was ever physically transferred to the
grantee and though the grantor apparently retained possession of the
deed until his death. Although the holding of the instant case does not,
in itself, change the law on the subject of delivery, there were state-
ments in the opinion indicating, perhaps, a relaxation of the former
requirements stated by the court in Gillespie v. Gillespie, where it said:
"Whether a deed has been delivered in the legal sense is not dependent
exclusively upon the question of its manual or physical transfer from the
grantor to the grantee but also upon the intent of the parties. Both the
delivery of the instrunent and the intention to deliver it are necessary
to a transmutation of title."2
It is the purpose of this note to examine, in the light of past cases,
the three requirements of a valid delivery as enunciated by the court in
24 Such an amendment has been suggested for presentation to Congress. Sturges,
Proposed Amendment of the United States Arbitrationt Act, 6 ARm. J. 227 (1942).
It has been suggested that the same result could be reached by a court simply lim-
iting the common law rule of revocability to commercial disputes and, on the basis
of public policy, refusing to extend the rule into the field of labor disputes. Latter
v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421 (1945) ; Comment, Arbitration
of Labor Contract Disputes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678 (1948). There is very little pos-
sibility of the federal courts reaching this result, however, because of the existing
line of cases which have refused to make this distinction.
'Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N. C. 629, 55 S. E. 2d 316 (1949). The court, how-
ever, held that the admission of incompetent testimony by the widow as to non-
delivery of the deed under which the grantee claimed title was prejudicial error and
set aside the verdict and judgment since the witness did not show that she had
had an opportunity to acquire personal knowledge of the facts of delivery.
2 Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N. C. 40, 41, 120 S. E. 822, 823 (1924). Italics
added.
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